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"Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty, for if
once it were left to the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily
whomever he or his officers thought proper, (as in France it is daily practised by
the Crown), there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities."! So
wrote Blackstone, and since his time, and of course earlier, the rhetoric of personal
liberty has been a standard feature of common law legal culture. You may recall
Dicey's discussion of the rule of law, or as he calls it in one passage, the
predominance of the legal spirit:
"In England the right to individual liberty is part of the constitution because it
is secured by the decisions of the courts, extended or confirmed as they are by
the Habeas Corpus Acts.,,2
And in Liversidge v. Anderson and Morrison,3 decided by the House of Lords on 3
November 1941, Lord Wright assured his audience that:
"All the courts today, and not least this House, are as jealous as they have
ever been in upholding the liberty of the subject.,,4
It would be easy to occupy the whole of this lecture with similar acts of obeisance
to the spirit, or perhaps I should say the ghost, of eighteenth century English
liberty, which are more or less obligatory in cases which do not much further
personal freedom. Now as you will know the Second World War was not a period
during which there seems, on the face of things, to have been any very close
connection between the rhetoric and the reality. For very many people were
imprisoned without term, or if you like euphemisms, interned, without any form of
trial, in flagrant violation of the ideal known as the Rule of Law. Detainees fell into
three categories. The first comprised aliens subject to executive deportation orders
"Professor of Law at the University of Michigan.
The Child & Co. Oxford Lecture 1987, printed by arrangement with Professor Simpson and Child &
Co..
I. W. Blackstone, Commenlaries OIllhe Laws of Ellglalld, YoU, Ch.l at II.
2. A. V. Dicey, IlllroduCliolllO the Sludy oflhe Law of the COllstitutiOlI,Ch.1V, p.191.
3. [1942] A.C. 206, an appeal from the Court of Appeal, reported [1941] 2 All E.R. 612, affirming a
decision by Tucker J in chambers which affirmed an order by Master Mosley.
4. At p.60.
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but, for one reason or another, not ripe for deportation. They could instead be
detained; I do not know the numbers involved but it was probably smalLs The
second category comprised aliens of enemy nationality. With very few exceptions
they were detained under the Royal Prerogative, and under a policy adopted in
June of 1940 around 30,000 were locked up, verymany being refugee Jews. There
is an extensive literature6 on this bespattered page of British history, to which I do
not propose to add, except to say that legal proceedings played no part whatever in
the attempts, which succeeded, to reverse the policy. The prerogative was beyond
challenge in the courts. Late in the war, and just after it, four enemy aliens did
bring suit; predictably it did them no good at all.7 One of the resulting reported
cases, involving "L. and Another", must be the only one in the Law Reports which
had been edited before publication by MIS.s
The third category comprised people detained under Regulation 18B of the
Defence Regulations 1939, a chimerical creature, much amended over time. I
shall be concerned with it only insofar as it permitted detention - it, and 18A, also
permitted lesser forms of restriction. So it was that my late colleague Dr Egon
Wellesz, hardly a sinister figure, was for long unable to remain in the Senior
Common Room of Lincoln College to take dessert, for he had to be in by nine.
Now although aliens could be, and occasionally were, detained under 18B, the
principal function of the Regulation was to legitimise the detention of British
subjects, without trial.9 Only two detainees appear to have been brought to trial for
offences whose commission was the reason for detention, but the number detained
but never tried was very considerable. In all 1,847 orders were made, some 750 or
more relating to members or past members of the British Union, Sir Oswald
5. Art. 12(b) of the Aliens Order 1920 allowed detention if deportation was not practicable, or
prejudicial to the efficient conduct of the war, and thought necessary in the interests of public safety,
the defence of the realm or the maintenance of public order.
6. P. and L. Gillman's Collar the Lot and R. Stent'sA Bespallered Page? provide full general accounts.
See also M. Kochan, Britai,l's buemees in the Second World War, A. Glees, Exile Poli/ics in Britain during
Ihe Second World War, G. Hirschfeld, (ed.), Exile in Great Brilaill.
7. See Nelz v. Ede [1946] I All E.R. 628; Ex parte Kuechrnmeisler [1946] IAll E.R. 635, 2 All E.R.
434; Ex parte L. alld Another [19451 K.B. 7; Hirsch and Anolher v. Somerville [1946] 2 All E.R. 430.
8. "Buster" Milmo (H. P. J. Milmo, later from 1964-82 a High Court Judge) was involved, but the
editing seems to have been done byJ. L. S. Hale. Both the Foreign Office and the Alien's section of the
Home Office wanted the case reported as a useful precedent. The story maybe followed in P.R.O. TS
27/555, though the background is obscure. Leopold Hirsch with his wife Olga and child Diane had
been detained in Trinidad in 1941; he was thought to be ell roule to Bahia to establish an espionage
network.
9. According to Herbert Morrison in the Commons on IMay 1941 (CoI.552) by then only two
detainees had been put on trial for actions leading to their detention. One would be Anna Wolkoff,
sentenced to 10 years on 7 November 1940 in connection with the Tyler Kent affair, on which see A.
Masters The Man Who Was M, Ch.6, and R. Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, pp.201-206. The other was
probably Christobel Nicholson, wife of Admiral Nicholson, on whom see Thurlow at p.l97. She was
acquitted on an Official Secrets charge at the same time. I do not know of any later cases.
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Mosley's fascist party.1OSome further figures may convey a notion of scale. I I The
peak number in custody was reached in August 1940, the end of the month figure
being 1428. The figure remained above a thousand until the end of 1940, and
thereafter fell steadily. At the end of 1942 there were 486 detainees, and, at the
end of 1943, 266. By December 31st, 1944, there were 65, and at the end of the
war in Europe eleven remained, in due course to be released, with one exception,
an alien awaiting deportation. He, the last victim of 18B, was perhaps Leopold
Hirsch, a mysterious character whom with his wife Olga, you may find concealed
as L, courtesy of MIS as I have explained, in the Law Reports at [1945] KB 7, and
again under his own name the following year. 12
Regulation 18B generated quite a considerable body of litigation, most of which
was handled by one solicitor, Oswald Hickson,13 who, I hasten to say, was not a
fascist but simply a liberal lawyer who took the idea of the Rule of Law seriously.
Details of the cases can be discovered from a variety of sources, in particular the
reports, the papers, and such files as have been released in the Public Record
Office.14 I should explain that these never include the MIS files, though quite a
deal of MIS material has, as it were, leaked into other places, and I must also
explain that my own investigations are far from complete. So this lecture is in the
nature of an interim report only.
Now I fear that the enthusiasm of the courts for liberty cannot have seemed very
impressive to our 1,847 detainees, for only one single individual, Captain Charles
Henry Bentinck Budd, formerly in the 1914-18 War, of the 5th Dragoon Guards,
and 5th Buffs, and in 1939-40 an officer in the Royal Engineers, was actually
released by court order, or indeed given any other form of redress by the judges of
England. Budd had joined the British Union in 1933 and left in 1939; he had been
a paid organiser in West Sussex from 1933 to 1936. He had been detained on 15
June, 1940 and was released by court order on 27 May, 1941. But I fear his
triumph was short lived, for he was re-arrested in a little over a week, on 6 June,
under a fresh order, and his second attempt to secure liberty through litigation
failed, reaching the Court of Appeal on 25 February, 1942. Budd was eventually
released on or about 25 May, 1943, and again sued, without success, this time for
damages for false imprisonment with respect to the original period of wrongful
10. The total is given in P.R.O. H045/25758. There is no complete available breakdown into
categories, or nominal roll of detainees, so the figure of 750 is an estimate.
1I. Monthly returns to Parliament are available in the Parliamentary Papers. The references are: IV,
203 (1.9.39-30.9.40); IV, 247 (1.10.40-30.9.40); IV, 221 (1.10.41-31.8.42); lV, 345 (1.9.42-30.9.43);
Ill, 227 (1.10.43-31.10.44); V, 75 (1.11.44-9.5.45).
12. Supra n.7. Olga appears to have ended up in Paraguay; what became of Leopold I do not know. I
guess he may during his detention have become a double agent.
13. Oswald Squire Hickson (1877-1944) was Senior Partner in Oswald Hickson, Collier & Co. See
Who Was Who, Vol. IV. He was described by Sir Norman Kendal, head of the C.LD., as "the notorious
solicitor". See P.R.O. HO 45/2578 (860060).
14. Principally consisting of a number of Treasury Solicitor's files and a very select group of Home
Office papers connected with fascist detainees, the so-called "Mosley Papers", discussed by Thurlow,
up. cit., supra n.9, Introduction.
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detention; this action failed before Asquith J in June of 1942.15 Characteristically
the judge explained that he hoped that he was "not lacking in zeal on behalf of the
liberty of the subject". As an indirect consequence of the success of Budd's first
action Herbert Morrison released some twelve other detainees in like case; the
"copy" of the original order served on the detainees had failed to correspond with
the original signed by the Home Secretary.16 But of these happy twelve, eleven
were similarly re-arrested.17 On the face of things at least the courts, and the
principle of the Rule of Law, do not seem to have done a great deal for civil liberty
so far as Regulation 18B detainees were concerned.
Now to be sure many of the detainees were not nice people, and no doubt too a
proportion needed to be locked up. At the other end of the spectrum it is also true
that some quite outrageous decisions to detain were taken. Since, for reasons
which will continue to excite the curious until a proper disclosure of the records
takes place, the release of records connected with 18B has been highly selective, it
is quite impossible to form any quantitative estimate on these matters, and so all I
can do is to give you an example. It concerned one Harry Sabini, alias Harry
Handley, also known as Henry Handley, Henry S. and Harry Roy.18 You will
guess from this that he was not a model citizen, but a citizen he was, being born in
London to an Italian father (who died when he was an infant) and an English
mother. He had never visited Italy nor did he know any Italian, and his five
brothers were in like case. The Metropolitan Police did not like Harry; he
apparently belonged to a gang known as the Sabini gang, which ran a protection
racket connected with the allocation of bookie's pitches. One brother, Joseph, was
indeed a bookie, and had been given a three year sentence back in 1922 for
shooting with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Harry's convictions were more
modest. He had in 1922 been fined a total of £8 for assault, and in the same year
he had been bound over for threatening behaviour with a revolver. In 1921 he had
been fined £2 for obstruction and in 1924 he had been fined £2 for drunkenness.
Chief Inspector Green saw him kick one Hutton, when drunk, at Ascot, but no
charges were brought. He was hardly, I think you will agree, a major villain. He
was detained along with his brother Darby Sabini on 14 June, 1940 under an 18B
order based on his hostile origins, which of course he did not have, and placed in
15. In the reportsBudd's litigationcanbe followedin [1941]2 AllE.R. 749; [1942]1AllE.R. 373;
[1943]2 AllE.R.452,but the firstaction,inwhichhe succeeded,wasnot reported.Onewonderswhy
not. See howeverThe Times, 28May 1941,ge.Muchmaterialexistsin TS 27/506.
16. The orderwasan omnibusorder, onwhichsee belowtextto n.44.The arrestingpoliceheld the
originalorder, to be returned endorsedand the copies,one for the detaineeand one for the Prison
Governor.
17. StatementbyHerbert Morrisonon 10June 1941(seeHmlsard at coI.23-24).
18. Sabini'scasewasnot reported,butwasregardedasestablishingjudicialreviewincasesofmistaken
identity.See The Times, 21Jan. 1941at 2g.MyinformationcomesfromP.R.O.TS 27/496AandHO
45125720. The latter,muchweeded,wasdeclassifiedaspartofthe "MosleyPapers"on lOJune,1985.
It has no relevanceto Mosley.Anothershockeris recordedbyLord Denningin The Family Story at
p.130.The individualwasprobablythe Revd.H. E. B.Nye.
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Brixton. He was described as Harry Sabini, alias Harry Handley. The initiative
was apparently taken by the police, not by MIS, which does not seem to have been
at all involved, though one cannot be certain as the Home Office file appears to
have been sanitised. He was given in November the reasons for the order, dated 27
November 1940. This document said that the order was based on his hostile
associations, and gave the following particulars: That the said Harry Sabini
(i) is of Italian origin and associations (my italics);
(ii) is a violent and dangerous criminal of the gangster type, liable to lead
internal insurrections against the country.
Police reports conceded that he had no known interest in politics, but opined that
he was:
a dangerous gangster and racketeer of the worst type and appears to be a most
likelyperson who would be chosen by enemy agents to create and be a leader
of violent internal actions against the country.
Sabini brought habeas corpus before a Divisional Court on 20 December 1940, his
case being primarily presented as one of mistaken identity; by affidavit he denied
being ever known as Handley, and Humphreys J indicated at the first hearing that
he seemed to have good grounds, adjourning the case until 20 January 1941 for
this matter of identity to be cleared up. The Home Office at the adjourned hearing
put forward not only an affidavit of normal type from the Home Secretary, but
quite a body of evidentiary material - affidavits from police officers showing that
he did operate under the alias Handley, and generally that he was a thoroughly bad
lot. This satisfied the Court. The application was refused, and this in spite of the
bad muddle over the formal grounds for detention, which the Court was prepared
to overlook. But on 18 March, presumably because of the report of the Advisory
Committee, of 3 December 1940, which is not in the file, Herbert Morrison
released him. He was promptly arrested and charged with perjury arising from his
affidavit, claiming he did not use the name Handley. For this he got nine months
on 8 July 1941. What became of his brother I do not know. It had all been a bad
business, and Harry, whatever may be said about his nine months sentence for
perjury, had been locked up for some nine months under 18B without any
respectable justification whatsoever.
Now how did all this come about, looking at the matter from a legal point of
view?The infamous conception of 18B took place at a gathering back in 1937, the
bureaucratic equivalent of group sex - I refer of course to an interdepartmental
committee. The chairman was Claud Schuster, Clerk of the Crown, Permanent
Secretary to the Lord Chancellor, of Winchester, New College and the Inner
Temple, father of the Law Revision Committee.19 He was among the numerous
19. Claud Schuster (1869-1956), later Baron Schuster, is in the D.N.B. (1951-60). On his committee
see HO 45/20206.
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lawyers, one of whom we have already met, who enthusiastically set about the
erosion of the Rule of Law. In the 1914-18 War internment of British subjects had
been confined to those who, though technically British subjects, were in substance
enemy aliens.2o An example would be the wife of a British subject whose husband
had always lived in Germany since childhood, and who herself had never, since
marriage, left Germany. Hence the requirement that they be of "hostile origin or
associations". But this was not enough for Sir Claud; in the coming war there
might be trouble from:
persons activated, not by sympathy with the enemy, but by "internationalist"
affiliations, or by disinterested opposition to the war.
Presumably this meant communists and pacifists. You will note the alarming
development from interning the potentially disloyal, to interning the loyal who
happen to disagree with the government; it comes as no surprise to know that Sir
Claud squabbled continuously with Lord Chief Justice Hewart, author of The New
Despotism (1929). So a regulation was drafted accordingly, but put on ice, there
being no hope of obtaining parliamentary support for the abolition of civil liberty in
peacetime.21 The Regulation, (originally Regulation 20) read:
The Secretary of State, if satisfied, with respect to any particular person, that
with a view to preventing him acting in any manner prejudicial to the public
safety, or the defence of the realm, it is necessary to do so, may make an
order:
And the draft Emergency Powers Bill included an even wider power to make
Defence Regulations by Order in Council:
for the detention of persons whose detention appears to the Secretary of State
to be expedient in the interests of the public safety or the defence of the realm
It will be seen that these texts, the first based on necessity and the second on
expediency, do not in any way limit the categories of potential detainees. But there
were some concessions to the legal spirit. There was to be an advisory committee
or committees, chaired by a real judge or former judge, and a right to legal
representation, and a memorandum of October 1938 envisaged two MPs serving
with the judge.
As hostilities approached MIS gave some thought to who would need to be
locked up, and on 16 January Brigadier A.W.A. ''Jasper'' Harker, Vernon Kell's
20. In the 1914-18 war the Regulation was 14Bmade under S.I(I) of the Defence of the Realm Act of
1914 (c.29 and 63). British subjects could only be detained in view of their "hostile origin or
associations" on the initiative of the military or an Advisory Committee. Regulation 14Bwas upheld as
illiravires in Ex parle Zadig [1916] 1K.B. 738. About 70 was the maximum number detained at any time
in the War.
21. The Schuster committee reported to the Committee of Imperial Defence on 21 Aprill937j the
latter accepted the extension of the internment power. Sir Samuel Hoare, then Home Secretary, drew
attention to the change, which he envisaged as useful against communists.
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deputy, sent the Home Office an estimate of fifty. For Ulster the number was,
incredibly, just one, a woman. The modesty of MIS's demands is noticeable.22
Kell wrote to Ernest Holderness at the Home Office on 16May, asking for orders
to be signed in advance, and held by MIS, but this was resisted. The Permanent
Under Secretary, Sir Alexander Maxwell, thought it improper to ask the Home
Secretary to sign orders "under a power which does not at present exist", and the
Home Office wanted to keep control of so important a matter. So Kell did not get
his orders. When war became imminent the Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill
was, on 24 August 1939, rushed through a docile Parliament.23 But an attempt was
made to amend it so as to make a High Court judge the final arbiter of decisions to
detain. Sir Samuel Hoare, then Home Secretary, resisted this; he was adamant
that "this must be an Executive Act", though he expressed sympathywith the need
for some check, mentioning the possibility of Advisory Committees. So the
amendment was withdrawn. He also gave a weird undertaking not to "introduce
regulations that would affect the liberty of the subject, bywhich I mean regulations
for internment and so on, that was put into force between 1914 and 1918." On 1
September the whole code of Defence Regulations was promulgated by Order in
Council, and 18B, in the form I have outlined, was brought to its monstrous
birth.L4 At the same time the checks had been reduced - no right to legal
representation, and no judicial chairman for the Advisory Committee. Walter
Monckton had been lined up for the job; he was neither a judge nor, at this stage,
did he want to be one.
Eleven days after the Privy Council was brought to bed of 18B, Robert William
Liversidge applied for a commission in the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve.25
He was commissioned Pilot Officer with seniority dating from 20 November,
being assigned to Administration and Special Duties, in particular intelligence
duties. He was posted to a Bomber Command base at Wyton and then to
Wattisham, near Ipswich, as a photographic intelligence officer. In his application
he did something which seemed a good idea at the time, but turned out to be a
mistake. He claimed to have been born in Toronto on 28 May 1901 of Canadian
parents of the name he now bore. In fact he had been born in London on 11June
1904 and, as Jacob Perlsweig, he was in reality the son of Asher and Sarah
Perlsweig. Asher was a Rabbi from Russia who had emigrated to England between
189S and 1904. Our man had indeed formally changed his name in 1937, and used
the name Liversidge well before that. The reason for the mis-statement in 1939
was purely patriotic; he feared that his parentage being both non-British and
Jewish might have prevented his being accepted.
22. P.R.O. HO 45/25758. An earlier verbal estimate was thirty. In the event MI5 submitted a list of
only 23 names on 22 August 1939. See HO 45/25114/863686.
23. See Hansard for 24 August 1939 at co1.63 el seq..
24. S.R. & O. 1939 No. 927.
25. Information on R. W. Liversidge is principally from TS 27/501. I am grateful to other
correspondents including Air Commodore H. A. Probert, the Earl of Selkirk, Professor R. V.Jones and
Professor De Lloyd Guth.
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For the moment however let us leave Pilot Officer Liversidge briefing the
aircrew of 107 and 110 Squadrons, who had the misfortune to fly Blenheims on
very hazardous missions. He, at least for the moment, had kept out of trouble.
Regulation 18B had not.
hs publication caused a Commons revolt, led by Dingle Foot, and the new
Home Secretary, Sir John Anderson, had a bad time trying to defend it as if it was
all his fault, rather than Sir Samuel Hoare's.26 Dr Edith Summerskill even asked
the Deputy Speaker:
Is it in order for the Home Secretary to treat this as if we were natives of
Bengal?
where Sir John had indeed served as Governor from 1932-37.27A division, which
could have left the country with no Regulations at all, was bought off by a promise
to introduce a new 18B after consultations, and on 23 November, by which time
some 26 orders had been made (not the fifty Kell had foreseen), the new 18B
appeared.28 As analysed within the Home Office29 this set out five classes of
potential detainees:
(1) people of hostile origin;
(2) people of hostile associations;
(3) people who had recently been concerned in acts prejudicial to the
public safety or the defence of the realm;
(4) people who had recently been engaged in the preparation of such acts;
(5) people who had recently been engaged in the instigation of such acts.
Mr L. S. Brass, the assistant legal adviser, who conducted this analysis, seems to
me to have got the figure wrong, but let that pass. So far as all categories were
concerned the Home Secretary had to have reasonable cause to believe that the
individual fell into one or more of the categories, and that by reason thereof it was
necessary to exercise control over him or her. The Home Office policy was
however to treat the new Regulation as essentially creating two categories of the
lockable up. They were:
(1) hostile association detainees, plus, where appropriate, hostile origins;
(2) recent acts prejudicial detainees.
Appropriate forms of order rehearsing the relevant part of the text of the
Regulation were therefore prepared, and Sir Alexander Maxwell in due course
drafted a letter of instructions to Chief Constables on the procedures to be
26. See Hansard for 31 October, 1939.
27. J. W. Wheeler Bennett's Life of Sir John gives a sympathetic account of his time at the Home
Office. It seems clear that he did favour liberty at a time when it was politically not easy to do so: see
esp. pp.237-57.
28. S.R. & O. 1939 No. 1681.
29. P.R.O. HO 45/25758.
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followed in making arrests: this, known as "the Maxwell Letter", is available in the
accessible material in the Public Record Office.3o
It was envisaged in late 1939 that the normal use of 18B would conform to the
policy adopted in the previous war; it would be used to legitimise the detention of
people who were in substance enemy aliens - hostile association or origin cases. It
would only be used to lock up real British subjects on the ground of acts
prejudicial in I.R.A. cases, and perhaps there would be the occasional reckless
fascist. Of course in wartime, more particularly now there was a massive code of
Defence Regulations, citizens who went in for acts prejudicial could, if there was
proper evidence against them, perfectly well be tried and sentenced for an
appropriate offence. There was no need to detain them without trial.
Within the Home Office respect for legality and the spirit in which the law had
been changed led in December of 1939 to the conducting of a curious ritual, well
known to lawyers, and called "directing one's mind". There were still in detention
24 people interned under the first version of 18B. The officials felt it right for Sir
John to continue their detention only ifit could be justified under the new 18B.31
The Home Secretary
ought now to direct his mind to the question whether, as regards each person
detained, he has reasonable cause to believe that such a person is of hostile
origin or associations, or has recently been concerned in acts prejudicial. ..
So a brief summary of the case against each detainee was prepared, and this was
initialled and presumably read by Sir John. He also initialled a covering
memorandum. Twenty four acts of initialling, evidencing, in case evidence be
needed in the future, twenty four actions of directing the mind. As matters hotted
up in 1940 this rather leisurely mind directing had, of necessity, to go by the board,
as we shall see.
In the period of the phoney war the use of 18B was restrained, and there is no
reason to doubt that Sir John would see papers of some sort on all the cases, or a
summary of them. Surviving and accessible materials do not however enable one to
be sure precisely what passed over his desk. Presumably it would consist of the
Home Office file with minuted advice from the officials, including that of the
Permanent Under Secretary, Alexander Maxwell. By the end of April 1940 only
136 orders had been made, and only 58 individuals remained in detention. Now
the principal safeguard or check embodied in the regulations was the right of the
detainee to make objections to an advisory committee (as well as representations to
the Home Secretary direct), and it was provided that:
it shall be the duty of the chairman to inform the objector of the grounds on
which the order has been made against him and to furnish him with such
30. P.R.O. T5/511 has the text in use on 22 Mav 1940.
31. P.R.O. H045/25758. All were hostile origin 'or association cases, twelve involving espionage.
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particulars as are in the opinion of the chairman sufficient to enable him to
present his case.
It will be noticed that the "grounds" and "particulars" came from the chairman,
not the Home Secretary. There was no explicit provision dealing with the form of
the order, but the practice adopted was to serve a copy on the detainee of an
original which did rehearse the relevant parts of the regulation, using the two
categories I have explained. The detainee had thereafter to wait for some time
before he got the "grounds" and "particulars" from the chairman, in a document
headed "Reasons for Order". As we have seen in connection with Harry Sabini
this document might not provide much in the way of useful information.
The advisory committee first met on 21 September under Walter Monckton;32
at once it set about eroding the safeguards, by excluding lawyers from appearing
before it. Norman Birkett, another lawyer of course,33 took over and this decision
was confirmed on 16 October, though lawyers could assist a detainee in preparing
his case.34 In terms which will ring a bell with historians of the criminal law,
Norman Birkett wrote:
The Committee were satisfied that the absence of legal assistance placed the
appellant in no real disability, for they regarded it as a duty to assist the
appellant to formulate and express the answers he or she desired to make.35
Witnesses against the detainee were rarely seen by the Committee, and never in
the presence of the detainee. The Committee proceeded by conducting an
inquisitorial examination of the detainee, apparently usually based solely upon
material provided to it by MIS in a document called "Statement of the Case".36
MIS recruited a number of lawyers37 and they normally prepared these
documents. They were, it must be noted, prepared retrospectively after initial
detention, not before, sometimes long after. Hence the initial decision by the
Home Secretary was not based upon the "Statement of the Case". A transcript
32. Walter Monckton instead moved into censorship as Director-General of the Press and Censorship
Bureau, and soon became Deputy Director of the Ministry of Information.
33. William Norman Birkett, later Lord Birkett (1883-1962), became a judge in 194I so that from that
date the Advisory Committee was "judicialised". There is an article by Lord Devlin in the D.N.B.
(196I-70) and a Life by H. Montgomery Hyde. This discusses his work in the war at pp.469-72 and on
p.541 records that it gave him ulcer trouble. Cmnd.283 of October 1957 on telephone tapping should
inhibit any idea that Birkett was in the forefront of liberalism.
34. P.R.O. HO 283/22 is an account of the AdvisoryCommittee by G. P. Churchill, its Secretary until
c.5 March, 1941 when he was succeeded by Miss J. M. Williams. The Committee originallyworked in
6 Burlington Gardens, but on 30 September 1940 moved to the Berystede Hotel at Ascot. The use of
Churchill, a retired diplomat, as Secretary, was intended to emphasise the independence of the
Committee from the Home Office.
35. Memo of 10 Jan. 1940 in HO 45/25754.
36. Examples will be found in TS 27/501, 513, 514, 542.
37. I have noted S. H. Noakes, E.B. Stamp, H.P.]. Milmo, and G. St. Pilcher, all working at Blenheim
Palace, telegraphic address 'Snuffbox'. Other lawyers who worked for MI5, such as H.L.A. Hart and
Sir Ashworth Roskill, seem to have been in another division of MIS.
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was made of the hearing and some few of these are accessible.38 Birkett had
considerable charm and courtesy, and a somewhat cosy air was achieved; it has
been said that proceedings of the committee combined elements of a court martial
with a vicarage tea party. But since the "Statement of the Case" was not shown to
the detainee and he had only a vague idea of the supposed evidence against him in
no conceivable sense was he given a fair chance to exonerate himself. Nor did he
see the Report of the Advisory Committee.39
It is true that he was, as we have seen, given a document headed "Reasons for
Order", embodying the "grounds" and "particulars" as required by the
regulation, prepared either by MIS and transmitted with the approval of the
Chairman, or, very rarely, actually drafted by him, or perhaps more usually by the
Secretary, Mr G. P. Churchill, a retired diplomat. This was based on the
"Statement of the Case", being a highly expurgated version of it, and the reality of
the matter was that MIS controlled the process of expurgation. An even stranger
fact was that, as Sir John himself pointed out in a Home Office conference on 9
March 1943, the "grounds" and "particulars" given to the detainee were not the
Home Secretary's (or his officials') "grounds" and "particulars" at all; the
Advisory Committee was not told why the Home Secretary had decided to detain
the individual concerned, so the Chairman did not know. The "Reasons for
Order" supplied to detainees were a guess, based upon the MIS "Statement of the
Case"; they might or might not correspond with the considerations which had
motivated the Home Secretary.40 This fact was indeed coyly revealed by the
Attorney-General in John Beckett's habeas corpus case in the Divisional Court on
17May, 1943. Beckett's counsel dismissed this as being quite incredible, and the
Attorney-General failed to press the matter. No doubt he was delighted. Valentine
Holmes had advised against spelling the point out in an affidavit.41In none of the
cases did any of the judges grasp what was going on.
In January of 1940, with the experience of some thirty 18B cases behind him
Birkett set out, in the deeply self satisfied memorandum, from which I have
already quoted, the principles which his committee accepted. The following is an
extract:
The paramount consideration at all times has been the national safety and
security. Every fact and every circumstance in each individual case has been
examined in the light of the supreme necessity. When all the evidence has
been heard and considered, if any doubt remained that doubt was resolved in
favour of the country and against the .individual.
38. Examples in TS 27/514, 513.
39. Examples in TS 27/501, 514, 542, 495.
40. An account of this conference, which was concerned with litigation by Ben Greene, is in TS




So much for the golden thread and the spirit of Woolmington! This, let it be noted,
was in January of 1940, when we were still, as I recall, singing that,
"We'll hang out the washing on the Siegfried line,
If the Siegfried line's still there."
It maywell be however that Birkett's attitude explains the harmonious relationship
which existed between the Committee and Sir John Anderson. For during his
time, which ended in early October 1940, Sir John never failed to accept a
recommendation from the Advisory Committee, whether for continued detention,
or for release.42 In effect it seems that what was going on was that initial detention
was effectively determined by MIS, and rubber stamped by the Home Office,
though no doubt papers would pass across desks in the Home Office. Occasionally
detention would be initiated by the police, by an Aliens Tribunal, or by a Regional
Security officer, and perhaps such cases had extra attention. The Advisory
Committee then became seised of the case, and decided whether the person really
ought to be detained, and the Home Secretary delegated this decision to the
Committee. So long as the interval between arrest and appearance before the
Committee was a short one, this was not so objectionable as it was to become as
the delays became more serious.
In the early summer of 1940, in response to German military success and its
unfounded explanation by the mythical Fifth Column, the scale of internment
increased dramatically. First there were the ltalians;44 between 8-11 May MIS
submitted a list of 300 persons of Italian connections whom they thought needed
locking up, and two officials in the Home Office, Mr R. H. Rumbelow and Miss J.
M. Williams, devised what was to be known as an "omnibus order" - just one
order for Sir John to sign, which rehearsed the text of 18B, with a schedule of
names attached. The first schedule listed 27S names. Sir John signed on 13 or 14
May, leaving the date blank, and three further schedules were added later, though
whether Sir John ever saw these was never really established. The idea was that
detainees, when the order was activated, which happened on 10 June, when
Mussolini declared war, would be given a copy by the arresting police officers,
appropriately dated; these copies were sent out in advance of course of the
42. This appears from the monthly returns to Parliament. The Committee Reports carefully
distinguish "suggestions", which might not be accepted, from "recommendations": P.R.O.
H045/25758 (863044/20).
43. Some files contain a standard form, DR8, used to set out in a summary form, the reasons of MIS
and the Poliee for wanting the individual detained. Examples are in TS 27/507 (Arthur H. Campbell)
and TS 27/514 (Pitt Rivers). It seems impossible to discover whether this document went before the
Home Secretary at the outset, or indeed at all.
44. On the Italians and the "Fascia Order" see TS 27/509. The 18B order was of course aimed at
British subjects; numerous other enemy alien Italians were detained under the prerogative. The plan
was to intern all members of the Italian Fascist Party, and all between 16 and 70 with less than 20 years
residence in England. Some 600 were interned under 188 and 4,100 under the prerogative. See
P.R.O. HO 45/25758 (863044/59).
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retrospective dating of the master omnibus order. On 15May at Cabinet Winston
Churchill expressed the view that "there should be a very large round-up of enemy
aliens and suspect persons in this country". 45 This led to the mass arrest of the
aliens under the prerogative. Then, on 22 May, the Cabinet decided to employ
internment of British subjects for an entirely new purpose - not to detain
individuals who, as individuals, were disloyal, but to destroy an institution, Oswald
Mosley's British Union of Fascists. The reason was probably the fear, given the
risk of invasion, that Mosley, in cahoots with a group of other fellow travellers of
the right, who had held secret meetings, would work for a negotiated peace with a
view to putting Mosley in Number 10.46 Hence the decision on 22 May to intern
25-30 leading members of the British Union, and the later decision on 4 June to
detain some 350 local British Union officials. In the event around 700 active
members were detained; the reasons are obscure. About the same time other
supposed members of the group were detained, for example Ben Greene and John
Beckett by order of 22 May, and Admiral Sir Barry Domvile somewhat later on 6
July.
All this produced consequences for 18B. At the end of May there were 131
detainees, by the end ofJune 953 and by the end ofJuly 1,378. The officials and
the Advisory Committee, and presumably MIS, became overwhelmed with work.
Since there were now long delays before a case reached the Advisory Committee
the initial decision to detain mattered more than it had in the past; Domvile for
example had to wait over a year. In June Sir John made 826 orders, and, at ten
minutes mind directing per order, 137 hours work would be involved; mind
directing, especially with the omnibus orders, surely became perfunctory, little
more than a fiction. The affidavits submitted in litigated cases by Sir John and his
successor vary in form, but a number explicitly state this or something like it:
Before I made the said order I received reports and information from persons
in responsible positions who are experienced in investigating matters of this
kind and whose duty it is to make such investigations and to report the same
to me confidentially. I carefully studied the reports and considered the
information and I came to the conclusion that ...
This example comes from the Aubrey Lees case, litigated in 1940; the order was
signed on 19June, though dated 18June, at the height of the pressure, and surely
45. P.R.O. CAB 67/7. At first the Home Office seems to have resisted any considerable increase in
internment of British subjects, the candidates being at the time fascists and right wingers of one kind
and another, and communists. See CAB 65/7WM 123 (40), 128 (40).
46. For discussion see Thurlow, op. cit., supra n.9., Ch.9. It has been suggested that the decision was a
condition imposed by the Labour Party on joining the coalition government under Churchill, an
explanation Thurlow rejects. Given the current selective release of material the matter cannot be
viewed as clear. There is naturally speculation as to what government wishes to hide which would
explain the refusal to release all surviving material. A possibility must be the involvement of the Duke of
Windsor in schemes for a negotiated peace.
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indicates that the tradition of being economical with the truth was not invented by
Sir Robert Armstrong. With the increase in scale came formal mistakes. In May
and June of 1941 Home Office officials became nervous about the Italian "Fascio"
orders of 10June 1940, partly because it was unclear whether Sir John had ever
seen them. A review initiated by a Home Office official revealed an alarming
catalogue of mistakes. The grounds of the order provided by the Committee might
differ from the order, or the particulars not conform to the grounds. There might
be no evidence on file that a copy had ever been served, or that the detainee had
been correctly told of his rights. The "copy" of the order might differ from the
order, or have the wrong date. It was all very embarrassing.
Furthermore 18B had to be amended again, in fact on 22 May itself. The
selected fascists were not "of hostile associations" or "guilty of recent acts
prejudicial". So a new 18B lA was introduced, allowing detention of present or
past members of organisations - organisations subject to foreign influence or
control, or whose leaders had, or had had, associations with leaders of enemy
governments, or who sympathised with the system of government of enemy
powers.47 Of course the British Union was still an entirely legal organisation, and
someone must have found this odd, for on 26 June a further Regulation, 18AA,48
was promulgated allowing the Home Secretary to proscribe organisations. The
British Union was indeed proscribed, somewhat belatedly, on 10 July.49 By that
time of course something of the order of 400 members or past members were in
detention for belonging to a lawful political party. Why the matter was handled
thus I do not know. 18B lA was never, so far as I know, applied to any other
organisation; individuals like Admiral Domvile, founder of The Link, or Ben
Greene, one time Treasurer of the British People's Party, were detained by a
strained application of either "hostile associations" or "acts prejudicial". And,
somewhat strangely, no communists as such were ever detained, but, so Kim
Philby assures us, Roger Hollis, the responsible MIS officer, had assured Herbert
Morrison that the party was loyallybehind the war. This did not however prevent
the banning of the Daily Worker, the contents of which were directly available to
Herbert Morrison.5o
It was during this period that Pilot Officer Liversidge was arrested, on 28 May
1940. On this day too his commission was terminated. He was neither an Italian, a
Fascist, a fellow traveller of the right nor a pacifist. The order was for "hostile
associations", and its background is an intriguing one. On 27 February Liversidge
had been posted to Fighter Command Headquarters, which was at Stanmore, but
he may have actually worked, at some period, at the Headquarters of 11 Group at
Uxbridge. On 26 April he had been placed under close arrest by the Air Force,
47. S.R. & O. 1940770.
48. S.R. & O. 1940 1078.
49. S.R. & O. 1940 1273. A further 18B amendment (S.R. & O. 1940 No. 1682) took place in
September of 1940 to deal with invasion; it was never implemented.
50. Kim Philby, N.(y Silent War, pp.103-4.
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ostensibly because of his mis-statements back in September 1939, repeated in a
document he filled in on 26 April. The R.A.F. had no quarrel with his efficiency;
his Commanding Officer, Lord Selkirk, has assured me that he did his job well.
The R.A.F. was put up to it by MIS, who also provided derogatory information
about him, derived from the Metropolitan C.I.D .. I do not propose to go into this
material here except to say that Liversidge seems to have got into bad company as a
young man, that he was not a person who had ever been convicted of any offence,
and that the activities involved had nothing to do with any foreign power.
According to the records available, he had in 1940 come to the attention of
Intelligence when they were investigating a fraudulent scheme at Seaton
internment camp, in which money changed hands, ostensibly in return for
promises to apply pressure in high places to secure the release of alien detainees.
Although the details are obscure, he appears to have had contacts with two special
branch officers, both probably corrupt and on the make, and he may have acted as
intermediary, though not with any wrongful intention. Presumably it was this
incident which MIS learned about. The contacts with the special branch officers
had apparently originally been on another matter, to which I shall return.
On 15May Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Air Minister, wrote to Sir John enclosing
the C.I.D. report and saying:
I am certain you will agree it is most undesirable that a man with the
unsavoury and indeed dangerous associations of Perlsweig, who during
recent months has had access to information of a most secret character,
should be left at large either in the Service or in the Country.
Sinclair pointed out that Liversidge could be proceeded against for the offence for
which he was put under arrest, but the D.P.P. had advised him that for this he
would probably merely be bound over, or at worst imprisoned for three months.
Alternatively he could be kept in the R.A.F., under MIS surveillance, which he felt
would be unsatisfactory. Or he could be interned under 18B, the best solution.
The second suggestion is on its face very odd, and my suspicion is that it came
from Intelligence, who may have preferred, for their own reasons, to have him at
large. Sir John obliged with a "hostile associations" order, but eleven days later,
the delay suggesting some level of serious enquiry by the Home Office. So he was
conveyed to Brixton Prison, where he remained for the whole period of his
detention. Winston Churchill was at this time taking a lively and somewhat
malevolent interest in the locking up of important people, and Liversidge's name
was included in the list of "Prominent Persons" supplied to him on about 28 June,
and updated weekly for some time thereafter,SI The list also includes the name of
Frederick W. Braune, a British subject of German origin, and partner in the law
firm of Buckeridge and Braune, who were later to represent Liversidge in
litigation. He was an acquaintance of Liversidge's and they no doubt met in
51. P.R.O. HO 45/25747.
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Brixton. The use in the order of "hostile associations" was not of course in the
original spirit of this category, for Liversidge was not in substance an enemy alien.
It was, I suppose, the best fit available, there being no question of his having
engaged in acts prejudicial during his R.A.F. service, though a somewhat
desperate attempt was made to suggest the contrary to the Advisory Committee.
Now there is an oddity in this story as I have related it, falling into the Silent
Nocturnal Dog category, conceived by Sherlock Holmes. Why did MIS not itself
have Liversidge detained, but instead put the R.A.F. up to doing the dirty work?
That this was curious is confirmed by a letter in the Treasury Solicitor's file from
Norman Kendal, head of the C.I.D., to one Lewis Evans, Deputy Director of
Public Prosecutions. It is dated 3 May, before the Home Office had been
approached.
I am told this evening that you have been approached about the Liversidge
Perlsweig case. I may be wrong, but I am certain there is danger ahead here.
The case is one in which, if MIS have any real reason, they ought to apply for
internment under 18B. This they will not do and tried their best to bounce
me into charging him under 1(1)(e).
This is a reference I think to the offence involving the false statement, though I
confess that to date I have not tracked it down. The letter goes on to say that such a
charge would be ridiculous; only an Air Force offence is involved, and it is up to
the Air Force to deal with it. Kendal's letter thus confirms that MIS was, for some
reason, trying to pass the baby. Yet MIS was prepared to blacken Liversidge's
character, as appears from another accessible item. This is a note of a phone call
from one Stamp of MIS to the Home Office:
Mr Stamp telephoned re Liversidge to say that this is a very bad case and he
sees no reason why his appeal should have special authority.
"Special authority" may mean expedition through orders from on high. The E.B.
Stamp in question was the later judge Sir Blanshard Stamp, who worked for MIS
at this time, and you can make of this what you will.
Liversidge and some of his friends protested to the Home Secretary, and
objected to the Advisory Committee, his then solicitors, Messrs Silkin and Silkin,
assisting him in preparing his case and in trying to speed up the proceedings. The
Committee, as we have seen, had to provide the "grounds" of the order and the
"particulars", which was done in a document headed "Reasons for Order". The
MIS officer concerned was Gonne St Clair Pilcher MC, who was to become a
judge in October 1942, and he wrote to the AdvisoryCommittee's Secretary at last
on 12 September enclosing the "statement of the Case" and adding:
Presumably the grounds were hostile associations or acts prejudicial or both.
The case is rather an unusual one and I think in the circumstances the
Chairman of the Committee before whom he appears should draft the
"Reasons for Order".
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Notice again the passing of responsibility, and curious though typical ignorance of
the formal basis'"forthe order. On 2 October at last the "Reasons for Order" were
settled, and supplied to Liversidge and his lawyers:
Reasons for Order Made under Defence Regulation 18B for Detention of
Robert William Liversidge alias Jacob Perlsweig.
The Order for the Detention of Robert William Liversidge was made
because the Secretary of State had reasonable cause to believe the said
Robert William Liversidge to be of hostile associations.
Particulars
(1) The said Liversidge was born of Russian parentage. His father's name
was Asher Perlsweig, a Jewish Rabbi.
(2) The said Liversidge adopted the name ofWatkins, and in the year 1927
was associated with one Baumgarten in a conspiracy to defraud.
(3) In the year 1935 the said Liversidge was using a Canadian passport
containing false particulars.
(4) At or about this time the said Liversidge adopted the name of Stone and
was associated with a notorious sharepusher, Shapiro, in attempting to
defraud.
(5) On 12 September 1939, the said Liversidge applied for a commission in
the R.A.F. Volunteer Reserve and supported his application by false
particulars. By the false particulars so supplied he was successful in
being appointed a Pilot Officer and was performing the duties of
Intelligence Officer at a Fighter Command in the country and had
access to information of a very secret nature.
(6) The said Liversidge was an associate of swindlers and international
crooks.
(7) The said Liversidge was associated from time to time with Germans
and with those associated with the German Secret Service.
(8) On or about the 26 April 1940 the said Liversidge supplied further false
particulars on an official form, and was put under close arrest in respect
of this offence.
Now of course only paragraph 7 of this remarkable and offensive document is in
any way relevant to "hostile associations". Silkins pointed this out and asked:
Will you please let us have such particulars, giving names, dates, places and
circumstances
This request was, as normal, refused.
On 10 October Liversidge appeared before the Committee under Birkett's
chairmanship. The transcript, if it exists, is not available, but the report is, and this
admits that the case "caused considerable anxiety to the Committee". It went on:
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The nature of the case is one of a very peculiar character. The ground upon
which the order was made was that he was a person of hostile associations and
that by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him. .. it
appears that this ground is really difficult to substantiate.
The report goes on to say that the real ground was the belief that he was
untrustworthy, and had secret information, acquired as Intelligence Officer, which
he might reveal. But even this worried the Committee, for they saw no basis for
thinking he was a disloyal person who would reveal secret information. The
allegations of German associations did not impress the Committee at all. They
were that he had associated with one Nussbaum, who was interested in industrial
diamonds, and with one Richard Markus, a detainee, said to be a German
diamond swindler. Liversidge had in fact had regular business interests in
industrial diamonds, and had been Managing Director of the Carbonite Diamond
Company from May to November of 1937. Even ifhe did know some undesirable
people his business would inevitably bring him contacts of this type. No business
man can avoid them.
Nevertheless the Committee, applying its settled policy, was not prepared to
resolve any doubt in favour of the detainee against the Air Force. It therefore
recommended continued detention, but added that the passage of time might
change the position - the "very secret information" would in time grow stale. On
10 December the Home Office accepted this recommendation, and Liversidge
remained in Brixton until his eventual release on 31 December 1941. Perhaps he
was kept in Brixton, rather than moved to a camp, because it was easier to restrict
his ability to communicate with others. 52 But one year and eight months seems a
long time, and in any event what was the very secret information? The reference
may simply be to normal intelligence information on Fighter Command
operations, but this would rapidly have gone out of date. More plausibly the
reference could be to the fact that Liversidge worked in a unit engaged in
predicting German raids, and he, with an officer by the name of McCarthy, who
had worked at the signal interception station at Cheadle, had apparently succeeded
in forecasting a raid on Scapa Flow, which took place on 10 April 1940. I have
been unable to form any clear idea of how this was done, though the incident is
mentioned in contemporary sources. Liversidge was arrested before Professor R.
V.Jones' work on the German beams was carried out, so he could not have known
anything about that, and this work would surely by the end of 1940 have made
anything Liversidge knew obsolete. So the length of his detention is not easy to
explain.
52. Brixton was used for "leaders" like Mosley and "trouble makers" from the camps. The conditions
of detention were set out in Cmnd.6162 of 1939-40; the detainees were in theory not there to be
punished. But prisons were used as a penal measure. Conditions were in fact dreadful, and Cmnd.6162
another exercise in rhetoric, not reality. Detainees were also put in Walton Prison and even Dartmoor.
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I suspect, but cannot at this stage prove, that MIS had other interests in Mr
Liversidge. From humble beginnings he had established himself in business in a
considerable way before the war, after working for some time in Hollywood in the
film industry, where he had run a recording studio. He also had business interests
in other parts of the world. In 1936 he became General Manager of the London
Amalgamated Trust, which dealt in house property and financed scrap metal
deals. In 1937 he became involved in industrial diamonds and diamond tipped
tools, and in 1938 in a company involved in the wholesale brokerage of oil
royalties, whose records were apparently of interest to Intelligence, and explained
his contacts with the two special branch officers. Of course German access to oil,
particularly Rumanian oil, was of major strategic importance at this time. His
co-directors included the fourth Earl of Verulam (also a director of British
Thomson-Houston), Lt. Col. Cudbert Thornhill and Lt. Col. Norman Thwaites.
The fourth Earl,53who seems to have been something of a personal friend, had
interests in communications; he was an electrical engineer connected with Enfield
Cables Ltd. of which he became Managing Director and Chairman. 54Thornhill
had been involved in overseas intelligence work in Russia as Military Attache in
Petrograd from 1916-18, where he had been in contact with Samuel Hoare, and
worked in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office from
1940-46. Thwaites55 was our man in New York in the First War; amongst other
things he recruited the celebrated spy Sydney Reilly. In the inter war years
Thwaites became interested in fascism and became Chairman of the January Club
in 1934, a discussion group on the subject. He was also interested in aviation, and
edited Air. He may have also been associated with Liversidge's attempt to secure
patent rights in the Focke Achgelis F.W.161, the first practicable helicopter, which
flew in 1936 (and was publicly demonstrated by Hanna Reitsch in the Berlin
Sports Stadium in 1938);56material about this was found in Liversidge's flat when
he was arrested. Liversidge had also obtained specifications for a secret method of
transmitting radio messages, which he said he had supplied to the War Office
through Major GeneralJohn Hay Beith.57He knew Compton Mackenzie and was
a friend of Sir William Stephenson, known to the public asA Man Called Intrepid
or The Quiet Canadian, our man in America in the Second World War.58 It all
53. (1880-1949): see Who Was Who, Vol. lV.
54. (1883-1952): see Who Was Who, Vol. V. He wrote two volumes of memoirs, Velvet and Villegar and
The World Mine Oyster. They are hard to get and 1have not seen the second. See also C. Andrew, Secret
Service, pp.299-301, 316.
55. (1872-1956): see Who Was Who, Vol.V; C. Andrews, op. cit., p.312; R. Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of
the Right, pp.49-53, 137.
56. See John Fay, The Helicopters, History, Piloting and How It Flies, p.141 and K. Munson, Helicopters
and Other Rotorcrafl Since 1947, p.llO. In 1938 the Weir W5 Helicopter, of similar design (by C. G.
Pullin) flew.
57. The writer Ian Hay; at the time he handled public relations at the War Office.
58. From the tides of books about him byWilliam Stevenson (a different person) and H. Montgomery
Hyde. W. Stevenson has also published Intrepid's Last Case. On Sir William Stephenson, see also C.
Andrew, op. cit., supra n.54, pp.507, 650-3, 661.
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smells of the Great Game, and if Mr Liversaidge had been providing assistance
through his contacts to British Intelligence, perhaps to Sir Claude Dansey's
mysterious "Z" organisation, it would do something to explain the curious attitude
to his case exhibited by MIS. 59 Dansey collected strategic intelligence, principally
through business contacts in Germany and Italy, and there is in Hansard for 10
December a curious statement which I think links Liversidge with Dansey.
Richard Stokes, Labour MP for Ipswich, continuously campaigned against 18B,
and took a personal interest in Liversidge's case, writing to the Home Office on his
behalf. In a debate on the matter he set out categories of internees, saying this:
Then there is another category, which might apply to anybody. They are
members of a military intelligence department one of whom seems to be held
because he knew too much about the irregular dealings in oil in a particular
part of Europe.
Of course this remark is cryptic in the extreme.
Robert Liversidge and Ben Greene,60 whose actions were determined at the
same time were, as we have seen, by no means the only individuals who attempted
to use the courts to protect their liberties. Taking habeas corpus proceedings
determined, not necessarily finally since appeals could have been taken in some of
them, before the Lords decision in Liversidge and Greene in November 1941. I have
already given an account of Harry Sabini's case, determined on 20 January 1941;
there were at least eleven others (involving only nine people).61 There was also one
action for false imprisonment.62 For reasons of space I cannot here go into them,
but Home Office reaction to legal pressure was always to tender to the courts as
little as it seemed possible to get away with. From an administrative point of view
the ideal was of course simply affidavits from the current Home Secretary, and his
predecessor, which could be reduced to a standard form, in effect merely stating
formally, if slightly mendaciously as we have seen, that each Home Secretary had
acted conscientiously precisely within the Regulations. Going beyond this would
open a Pandora's box, or if you like, lift a flat wet stone, from under which various
unpleasant things might emerge to embarrass the officials. But it was not until the
59. On which see A. Read & D. Fisher, COIO/lelZ. The Secret Life of aM aster OfSpies (1984), C. Andrew,
op. cit., sllpra n.54, pp.537-40, 609, 616.
60. Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1942] A.C. 284, affirming the decision of the Court of
Appeal [1942] 1 K.B. 47, which affirmed a decision of the Divisional Court.
61. They involved Mathilde Randall (p.R.O. TS 27/495), Lieutenant Francis Fane (TS 27/513),
Captain Charles Henry Bentinck Budd (mpra n.15), Arthur Harry Campbell (TS 27/507), Sir Barry
Edward Domvile, Rita Kathleen Shelmerdine, Harald Henry Alexander de Laessoe, Emily Dorothy
Vanessa Durell, William Edric Sherston (TS 27/511, 491 and see In Re Shelmerdille and Others [1941]
Solicitors JOlin/ai, at p.ll) and Aubrey Lees, on which see infra, text to n.63. In TS 27/493 it is noted
that on 30 June 1941 there were also in some sense six other suits pending, including actions by the
Mosleys.
62. John Roland Smeaton-Stuart (p.R.O. TS 27/493, 491; The Times 26 June 1941 6b. and 27 June
6b; [1941] 2 All E.R. 655). There was also an application for mandamus and certiorari by John Mason:
see The Times 9 Feb. 1941 ge.
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decision in the case of Aubrey Lees63 that the courts produced, in an opinion of
Humphreys J, what might be called a theory of the relationship between the courts
and the Home Office, which provided guidance as to how little would suffice to
satisfy the judicial custodians of English liberty.
Lees was a colonial civil servant, very right wing indeed and virulently
anti-semitic. He was thought by the Special Branch to have formed part of the
group which may have been plotting with Mosley to establish a fascist state after a
negotiated peace. He was detained on 20 June 1940, under l8B lA, as a British
Union person, and applied for habeas corpus. In his affidavit he swore he was not,
and never had been, a member of the British Union, which was apparently true.64
Sir John replied with an affidavit that, on the basis of reports carefully considered,
there were clear gounds for believing, and he did believe, that Lees was a member
of the British Union, and that it fell within the Regulation. He put in a second
affidavit, stating that he thought it necessary to detain him, a point missed in the
first affidavit. Since Lees was not a member, and never had been, Sir John could
not of course swear that he was, and the Court could hardly have missed the
significance of this. Lees said he was not a member, and Sir John said he thought
he was, and had good grounds for thinking this. So what was the court to do about
it?
This case confronted the court for the first time with the problem that if it
seriously went into the justification for Lees' detention, it would have to go into the
facts of the matter, see the reports, and settle whether Lees was telling the truth or
not. It was one thing to go into the formalities of detention, as in Budtfs case, or
even to offer redress on so confined a matter as mistaken identity, as suggested in
Sabini's case, but quite another to range more widely. So the court backed off.
Humphreys J delivered an opinion which began with the usual rhetoric: "the court
entertains no doubt that upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus the court
has power to inquire into the validity of the order for detention, and for that
purpose to ascertain whether the Home Secretary had reasonable cause for the
belief expressed in the order. So much was frankly admitted by the
Solicitor-General ... " But, somehow or another, this libertarian rhetoric had to
be married to reality, reality being a refusal to investigate the basis for the belief. In
the same spirit the Solicitor-General had indeed strenuously resisted the idea that
investigating it could involve looking at the reports or the evidence - the only way it
could be investigated. Humphreys J was himself clear that it was not the business
of the court to investigate whether Lees ought to be interned, merely whether he
was legally interned, but he had boxed himself in by conceding that this depended
63. The case is reported in the Divisional Court 57 T.L.R. 26 and [194111 K.B. 72 and in the Court
of Appeal in 57 T.L.R. 68. Much further information is in P.R.O. HO 45/25728 and 1-10 283/45.
Morrison resisted a later attempt to reintern Lees.
64. Information on Lees is to be found in R. Thurlow, op. cil., supra, n.9, Chs.8 and 9. I-Ie is not to be




upon the basis for the Home Secretary's belief. How was the matter to be
investigated in a manner which amounted to not investigating it? He had recourse
to that time honoured common law substitute for rational thought, relied on by
generations of judges when confronted with an intellectual problem which is
beyond them:
In our opinion no general rule can be laid down and each case must be
decided on its own special facts.
So that, empty though it sounds, was the theory, the rhetoric. Now for the reality,
the practice. He then said that, having read the affidavits of Sir John, he believed
them. Needless to say he makes no further reference to the affidavit of Lees. Lees
appealed, but by the time the appeal was considered he had in fact been released,
and the appeal was pursued merely because Lees or his counsel thought he should
get costs. The Court of Appeal agreed with Humphreys J's opinion. In the course
of the hearing Sir William Jowitt assured the court that he had himself seen the
reports on which the Home Secretary had acted and he (counsel) "regarded it as
obviously against the public interest that the names of the informants should be
disclosed." Nothing so brings out the subservience of the judiciary to the executive
as the fact that he got awaywith this devious device for introducing the effect of
evidence, without the judges themselves ever seeing it, or even, so far as one can
tell, asking to see it. What was fit for the eyes of Sir Williamwas not for the eyes of
the judges of England. He did not mention that the Attorney-General had
persuaded Birkett to delay submitting the Advisory Committee report until after
the Divisional Court hearing; it had found for Lees and recommended release,
and was therefore embarrassing.
Now the practical effect of the Lees decision was that so long as the formalities
were handled correctly, and no mistake as to the person had occurred, all the
Home Office had normally to do in habeas corpus proceedings was to put in a
formal affidavit and the court would accept their assertion that the Home
Secretary had acted within the regulations. To put it another way the court had
reduced its protection of the liberty of the subject to an insistence upon respect for
mere formality, leaving the substance of the matter to the AdvisoryCommittee and
Home Secretary. As Gerald Gardiner said when the case was before the Court of
Appeal:
If it were considered sufficient, in order to detain a person under those
regulations, merely to make an affidavit of the kind made by the Home
Secretary, then it was virtually useless for any person to make application by
way of habeas corpus. Were such a person as innocent as the day or a true
patriot, however wrongfully he was in prison, the Home Secretary had only to
make an affidavit saying that, at the time, he reasonably believed certain
allegations to be true to prevent the person being released.
65. Supra n.".
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The effect of all this was to pass the responsibility for protecting civil liberty
back to the Advisory Committee. Its position had somewhat changed since
Anderson ceased to be Home Secretary. During his time its recommendations
were, as we have seen, always accepted. Under Herbert Morrison this was not the
case. The monthly reports to Parliament reveal that in November 1940, for the
first time, three recommendations were not accepted. In January of 1941 the figure
had risen to 55, that is during that month. By the end of January 1941 there had
been Home Office decisions in 1026 cases reviewed by the Committee. 950 had
been accepted, 582 for release, and 368 for continued detention; 76 differed, 75
being continued in detention contrary to the recommendation, and one released.
Differences continued to occur throughout 1941. Behind the figures lay a serious
conflict between MIS and the Advisory Committee, or we should say now,
Advisory Committees.66 Trouble had first broken out in July, in Anderson's time,
over the British Union detainees, and threatened the independence of the
Committees that Sir John had nurtured.67 In reviewing these cases the Committee
took the view that they had to decide both whether the individual concerned was or
had been a member of the British Union, and whether it was necessary for control
to be exercised over him or her as an individual. The MIS line was that so long as
the first point was established, that was the end of the matter, since a political
decision had been taken to cripple the British Union, which was to be
implemented not simply by banning the organisation, nor yet by locking up all its
members, but by interning all or most of its officials, about 350 or so, to whom
were added, in a spirit of overkill, a further three hundred and fifty active fascists.
This policy, MIS argued, would be frustrated if detainees' cases were considered
individually, and large numbers, in consequence, released because they appeared
harmless to the Advisory Committee. The chief offenders, in the eyes of MIS,
seem to have been Chairmen Wallington and Morris. The available papers show
this row rumbling on up to November 1940, with the Home Office under
Anderson backing the Committee, and Lord Swinton, head of the Home Defence
Security Executive, egged on by Messrs Pilcher and Stamp, inclining to favour
MIS. A compromise solution was adopted by the Cabinet on 21 November. In the
course of the row F. B. Aikin-Sneath, who was the MIS officer responsible for
keeping an eye on the fascists, held a somewhat tense meeting with the Advisory
Committee chairmen, coming in particular into conflict with Mr Wallington. At
this meeting, according to his note of what took place:
Mr Wallington emphatically repudiated the idea that a man should be
interned merely on the ground of being an active official of British Union. He
66. In response to the great incarceration of 1940 Birkett's committee had been relieved on June 7 of
the job of considering cases of enemy aliens, and on June 17John W. Morris, KC, MC, later a judge,
was appointed Deputy Chairman and the Committee sat in two panels, increased, on II July to three
(Chairman H.J. Wallington, KC, later a judge) and July 22 to four (Chairman A.T. Miller, KC). On 30
September the panels moved to the Berystede Hotel, Ascot, and there sat in three panels, chaired by
Birkett, Morris and A.W. Cockburn, KC.
67. What follows is based on P.R.O. HO 45/25754.
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contended that if this principle were accepted the work of the Committee
would be a farce. The only task would be to confirm automatically decisions
arrived at by MIS.
Aikin-Sneath asked him what principle would he apply? He relied in traditional
common law style:
I have no principles. It is not possible to lay down a general principle.
In fact however he did have one. He argued that, as a man of wide experience,
he could tell on all the facts "whether the person before him was likely to be a
danger to the country or not." The meeting ended in deadlock, and although it
was later strenuously denied that there had been resignations from the
Committee68 it is noticeable that Wallington fades quietly away, leaving more
accommodating colleagues to run the ship at Ascot. Similar conflicts arose
between Sir Percy Loraine, chairman of the special committee for the Italians, and
MIS in the persons of Brigadier Harker and H. Everett, and although the available
documents do not enable one to be sure, I suspect that these troubles rumbled on
through 1941. Furthermore the Advisory Committee was under continuous
criticism for delay, both from Members of Parliament, individuals and particularly
from Oswald Hickson. There was also much criticism of the fact that detainees
were never officially told the outcome of their appearance before the Advisory
Committee, much less allowed to see the report of the Committee, and also
criticism of the inadequate information which the Committee gave them in the
"Reasons for Order". Internal documents within the Home Office seem to have
conceded that this complaint was sometimes justified. Thus a long memorandum
of 14May 1941 on the case of A. H. Campbell69 treated the matter as disturbing,
one reason being:
the statement which Campbell received is of the most meagre character and
deserves all the criticism which has lately been received that a detainee is put
before the Advisory Committee without any proper knowledge of what is
alleged against him. All the statement in fact informs him is that he has been
guilty of anti-British and pro-German views. There is no apparent reason
why a much fuller statement of his actions should not have been brought to
his notice on the lines of the statement of the case.
68. See Hansard IO April 1941 (Mr Osbert Peake at col.1676) and 22 April 1941, col.33. The Advisory
Committee was formally "reconstituted" in April of 1941 after Churchill had gone, and thirteen
members formally left it. They included H.J. Wallington, and A.T. Miller, who had in fact ceased to sit
well before this time.
69. Arthur Harry Campbell had been detained under a "hostile associations" order of 19June 1940;
the "Reasons for Order" failed to correspond, giving membership of the British Union as the
"grounds". This had been drafted by].P.L. Redfern of MIS. In truth the order should have been made
for "acts prejudicial". Campbell's action failed because he was released as a consequence of Budd's
case and then detained afresh under a new order, which was formally correct. The file (P.R.O. 1'5
27/507) provides much evidence of the nervousness of the officials at this period.
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In a somewhat beleaguered state the Home Office understandably reacted in
part with the Armstrong solution. Thus we find on 23 July Mr Osbert Peake,
Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, assuring members in the
Commons, when asked by Mr Stokes to give an assurance that detainees "are
themselves given full reasons for their detention":
That assurance, of course, has been given by my right honourable friend and
myself from this Box on many occasions, and it is invariably the practice of the
Advisory Committee to put before these persons, as explicitly as they can, all
the facts which are known against them.
Notice the small print: "as explicitly as they can".70 And, when the alarming
number of errors over the Italian orders came to light the detainees were not
informed nor was any attempt made to rectifYthe position by issuing new orders,
which would of course have called attention to the matter. It was hoped that the
outcome of the Ben Greene case in the Lords would throw light on the position,
but it did not, and in the end the matter was solved by doing nothing - and of
course the detainees were progressively released. So, no doubt to official relief, the
problems went away.
I hope I have given you enough information to convey an impression of the
context in which the Liversidge and Greene cases came to be litigated. Now the
decision in Lees had, as we have seen, preserved the theory that the court could
review the basis for the Home Secretary's belief. This left open the possibility that,
in what might be loosely called a Really Appalling And Apparent Case of Injustice
a court, employing the doctrine that the game had no known rules, just might, in
habeas corpus proceedings, go behind the Home Secretary's affidavit of standard
form. To quote an expression much used by my former Vice-Chancellor during
students' riots, always as a preliminary to inaction, There Might Be Things Up
With Which We Will Not Put. Some of the more chaotic Italian cases perhaps fell
into this category, but none were litigated. The case of Ben Greene was another
possibility, but missed the boat by poor timing. Given limits of space I cannot give
you a full account of the very complicated story of Ben Greene,11 but only a brief
summary. Ben Greene JP, Berkhamsted School and Wadham College, was a
Quaker pacifist. At one time he had been a member of the Labour Party, and
Private Secretary to Ramsay MacDonald. He became, in 1939, a founder member
and Treasurer of the British People's Party, of which Lord Tavistock72 was
Chairman, from which he had in fact resigned on 31 October 1939; he was never a
70. Hansard contains numerous examples of replies to questions and statements by Ministers which, to
put if softly, do not exhibit a high level of commitment to truth.
71. See P.R.O. 1'5 27/522; A. Masters, The Mall Who Was M, Ch.8; R. Thurlow, op. cit., supra n.9,
Ch.9.
72. Why Lord Tavistock (later the twelfth Duke of Bedford) was not detained under 18B is a mystery.
The possibility was considered by the Home Office Defence Security Committee on several occasions.
An opinion of the Attorney-General on the matter has not been traced in the available records.
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fascist. He was also associated with the British Council for Christian Settlement in
Europe. He was one of a somewhat strangely associated group of individuals
brought together through disillusion with existing political arrangements, and
opposition to the war, and as such had connections of an obscure character with
Mosley and others of the right, such as Admiral Domvile. Ben Greene would, of
course, have known Mosley from his Labour Party days. He was arrested on 24
May under an 18B order dated 18 May 1940, his name and that of John Beckett
being removed from the omnibus order when it was noticed that neither were B.U.
Members. The order was for "hostile associations". About 1 June, whilst in
Bruton, he received a copy of this order and on 15July the "Reasons for Order"
which stated the grounds as being "acts prejudicial", and set out the particulars in
eight paragraphs. Of these paras. 3 and 4 involved accusations of communications
with the enemy, if not treason, and para. 5 certainly amounted to an accusation of
treason. These three paras. were consequently more obviouslyrelevant to an "acts
prejudicial" order rather than a hostile associations order. Of the remaining paras.,
6 and 7 could only be relevant to an 18B lA order, and only para. 1 slightly
advanced the case simply for a hostile associations order.73 Greene's case came
before an advisory committee on about 20 July 1940 (Chairman Miller) and
continued detention was recommended. Presumably the committee accepted
MIS's assurances that their information was from a reliable source.
Now here really was a formal muddle, surely to be condemned under the need,
emphasised in the Sabini and Budd cases, for a meticulous conformity to the
regulations. Furthermore Oswald Hickson, who represented Greene, must, from
his own investigations, have been convinced that the case against Greene strongly
smelled of fabrication. So this looked like a Fairly if not Really Appalling case
which might get somewhere in spite of Lees, if only it could become Apparent too.
In March of 1941 Ben Greene brought habeas corpus before the Divisional Court,
but there, on 2 May, the Court (Humphreys, Singleton and Tucker,JJ) retreated a
little from the defence of liberty. Since Greene had a copy of the original order,
which copywas correct, and since, if all that was said in the particulars was true, he
was "of hostile associations", whatever else he might be too, he had suffered no
prejudice. As for his allegation that the Home Secretary had no reasonable basis
for his belief the Court, following Lees, simply felt convinced by the Home
Secretary's affidavit that he had. But some mild sense of guilt must have hung over
the judges, for they thought that the case had better go back to another differently
constituted Advisory Committee for a rehearing, and they so suggested.74 This
idea was welcomed by the Home Office, but could not be acted on whilst litigation
continued. On 10June 1941 a new "Reasons for Order" was served, and it would
of course have been deeply embarrassing not to stick to the same particulars, so
73. The text of the "particulars" is in A. Masters, The Mall Who Was M, pp. 183-4, but the grounds
printed there ("hostile associations") are from the amended "Reasons for Order" of 10June 1941.
74. The decision is briefly reported in the Solicitors Journal for 1941 at p.298; there is a text of the
opinion in TS 27/522.
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that was done, and the grounds only amended, to "hostile associations", to
conform to the order. Hickson enquired whether it was intended to prosecute for
the grave offences alleged, and was told "No". Considerable nervousness seems
to have existed behind the scenes as to whether the Divisional Court's submissive
approach would survive on appeal. The Court of Appeal (Scott, MacKinnon and
Goddard, LJJ) however, upheld the refusal of habeas corpus, on 30 July 1941.75
The opinions of the judges in the Court of Appeal moved one step further away
from the spirit oflegality. For doubt was cast on the Lees doctrine - that the Court
had power to enquire into the basis of the Home Secretary's belief, and the view
was expressed that the customary affidavits from the Home Secretary were not
needed. The order alone was an answer to habeas corpus, and the burden of proof
rested on the applicant to show that there was some reason not to accept the order
as valid. Lord Justice Goddard appears to have been the influential judge in the
case.
Greene's appeal then went to the Lords, being argued there on 23 and 24
September. Between this time and the delivery of the opinion on 3 November it
turned, too late for this round of litigation, into a Really Appalling and Apparent
case of Injustice. Hickson managed to obtain the names of the MIS agents who
had set up Greene; one was a devious individual, one Harald Kurtz, said to have
been distantly related to Queen Mary, who later established a reputation as a
historian. The names were supplied by the Advisory Committee under pressure
from the Attorney-General, who feared that the inadequacy of the original
particulars would lead to the loss of the habeas corpus action begun by Greene.
Greene's brother tricked Kurtz into Hickson's office, and Hickson got him to
retract what he had told his superior, Maxwell Knight of MIS, about Ben Greene.
But as you know it was all too late; Greene lost his case in the House of Lords, and
one can only speculate as to what might have happened if Hickson had had, at the
outset, this new and deeply embarrassing material. The outcome was that the
rehearing before the Advisory Committee, presided over by Birkett in November
and December 1941, involved the roasting of Kurtz, to the fury of the new head of
MIS, Sir David Petrie. MIS had been very hostile to the naming of agents, and
Kurtz' cover was now destroyed; he moved to a job in the BBe. ByJanuary a paper
was circulating in the Home Office recommending release and adding:
This case illustrated vividlythe possibility of injustice being caused to persons
who are detained purely or mainly on the evidence of agents employed by the
security service ... "
Oswald Hickson and Ben Greene did not give up the legal battle after release was
authorised, subject to restrictions, on 9 January. In March 1942, after having
succeeded in getting the allegations of treason formally withdrawn, Greene sued
for false imprisonment and libel, and there was considerable anxiety over the
75. [1942J 1 K.B. 87.
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possible need to produce the MIS agents involved in court, the other being a
Fraulein Stottingen, also known as Friedl Gaertner, code name "Gelatine", a
double agent, who features in J. c. Masterman's The Double Cross System. But in
the event, principally as a result of the decision in the Liversidge case, and in Greene
(No.1) but also because of the rules governing official disclosure and privilege in
defamation, this action failed, without any embarrassing revelations, in April of
1943. The immediate cause for the withdrawal of the action was a devastating
cross examination of Ben Greene. It had all been a nervous business, but after the
Lords decision of 3 November 1941 it became possible to get awaywith more or
less anything.76
And what of Liversidge v. Anderson and Morrison itself? I do not propose to go
over the much trodden ground of the technical law involved, or to comment upon
Professor Heuston's fascinating article on its immediate repercussions.77 The
form of the action, which was for false imprisonment, was conceived as an
ingenious attempt to get around the practice of the judges in simply accepting the
formal affidavits of the Home Secretary in habeas corpus proceedings, the reality,
that is, of Lees. An attempt was made in interlocutory proceedings to obtain an
order requiring the defendants to disclose particulars of the grounds upon which
the Home Secretary had reasonable cause to believe that Liversidge was of hostile
associations, and the grounds upon which he thought it was necessary to exercise
control over him. This order was refused, and Liversidge appealed, the House of
Lords ruling, by a majority, that so long as the Home Secretary acted in good faith
(which was not here impugned) the question whether an individual fell within a
category of permissible detainees was exclusively within the discretion of the
Home Secretary. Hence the order was refused for it would, if issued, bring before
the court material which it was not the business of the court to consider. This
Lords viewwent considerably beyond even the viewof the Court of Appeal, which
was that once an 18B order, on its face valid, had been produced, the onus of proof
that the detention was invalid rested upon the plaintiff, and since, on the facts, this
had not been displaced, the order would not be made. Such reasoning still offered
a ray of hope to detainees in a Really Appalling Case. The Lords extinguished that
ray.
Now what is a little odd about all this is that in the Regulations there was, as we
have seen, a duty, not on the Home Secretary, but on the Chairman of the
AdvisoryCommittee, to give the "grounds" of the detention and the "particulars".
So why did Liversidge in these proceedings ask to receive what he had already
been given? The explanation is not that he wanted the Home Secretary's actual
reasons, as opposed to those guessed by the AdvisoryCommittee or MIS. Neither
D. N. Pritt, his counsel, nor the judges, realised that there could be a difference.
What Pritt seems to have thought was that if the onus of proof was on the
76. On this litigation see a note by R.F.V. Heuston in (1971) 87 L.QR. at p.163.
77. "Liversidge v. Anderson in Retrospect". 86 L.QR. 33.
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defendants the meagre reasons provided to Liversidge by the Advisory Committee
would be inadequate to discharg-e that onus. More information would thus be
prised out of the Home Office.78 The significance of the majority view was
essentially negative; the Lords could have used the case to help detainees, without
necessarily taking over an appellate function, by requiring a fuller disclosure of the
reasons for detention than detainees had been receiving from the Advisory
Committee, by developing a more sophisticated analysis of the categories and
overriding requirements of the regulations and by "directing their minds" to the
conception of the burden of proof in a practical manner which did not make of it
an insuperable obstacle. But to have developed this line would have required them
to have possessed an understanding of the working of the system which they seem
to have entirely lacked, together of course with a commitment to civil liberties
which they did not possess, essentially I feel because they belonged to a tradition in
which the law is not conceived of as ever applying to them, but rather to other
people, lesser breeds, though to their misfortune breeds within the law ...
Lord Atkin's celebrated dissent is why we now read the case, and to be sure it is
as powerful an example of the rhetorical common law judicial opinion as is to be
found in the reports. But with some diffidence I think that its significance in terms
of reality can easily be misunderstood. In legal terms what he was upset by seems
at first glance to have been an intellectual vice, which he calls the virus of
subjectivism - the perverse idea that if the Home Secretary says he has reasonable
cause, then he does have reasonable cause, which en passant, was not what his
opponents meant anyway. So the case is seen as a case about false logic, and of
course as a case about civil liberties. But if you ask why he felt so strongly about all
this, I think it is fairly clear that what he was primarily distressed about was neither
logic nor liberty but judicial status - the relationship of courts to the executive. He
was genuinely repelled by the idea that, in relation to the most basic of all rights,
the courts should simply accept their subservience to The New Despotism. For the
whole scheme of the Defence Regulations must have brought home the fact that
the rise of government and the civil service had, in our system, which lacks either a
proper constitution or a jurisprudence of rights, profoundly threatened the status
of the judges. Indeed, as we surely now know, judges were by 1941 no longer very
important people in the scheme of government, as compared to the mandarins of
the civil service and the ministers who are thought to be in charge of them. Here
indeed were ministers and civil servants taking over the job oflocking people up -
what would they take over next? So, like Humphreys J in the Lees case, Lord Atkin
wanted to deliver an opinion which, at least at a theoretical level, maintained the
principle that, over civil liberties, the courts remained the superior partner in
government. To use Stable ]'S memorable expression, he wanted to show that
78. D. N. Pritt in his autobiography does not clearly explain his strategy: see TheAu/obiograpl!y olD. N
Pritt, Part One, pp.232-3, 304-7. An alternative technique might have been to use Ma/uianlllS under the
regulations to challenge the adequacy of the "Reasons for Order".
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judges were not simply "mice squeaking under a chair in the Home Office";
Stable J too had dissented, in Budd No.2. To this end Lord Atkin's rhetoric is
powerfully directed. The rhetoric involved is the rhetoric of fiction.
If, however, you then ask about the realities of what he favoured, it does not
seem to amount to very much, and I do not think he actually thought this out. In
one passage all he seems to be saying is that a plaintiff in civil litigation should be
entitled in court to the same grounds and particulars to which he was entitled
before the Advisory Committee, and since Liversidge had already had these the
practical effect of Lord Atkin's theory for Liversidge would have been nil,
particularly as Lord Atkin was quite happy to allowconfidential material to be held
back on security grounds. He imagined, quite wrongly, that the "Reasons for
Order" came from the Home Secretary, and were merely as it were handed on by
the Chairman. Nowhere in his opinion does he grapple with the regular complaint
that the information supplied was so meagre as to be quite inadequate. Nobody
had really raised the matter, and, like the other judges, he had only a vague idea of
how the system worked. It is true that in another part of his opinion he seems to
have envisaged that in some cases a court might, under the objective view, enter
into an investigation of the merits of detention, but in a world in which the Home
Secretary would be able to continue to hold back information, as he had in the
past, it is hard to see how a court, under his theory, could go against the executive
except in a case which was both scandalous and could without the disclosure of
such information be shown to be scandalous. An example would be one of the
Sabini type, involving error as to identity, which a plaintiff could easily establish
without Home Office disclosure, or perhaps something in the nature of a cast iron
alibi in an "acts prejudicial" case assuming specific acts had been mentioned in
"the particulars". Perhaps Lord Atkin's view would have put the success rate
above 1 in 1847, but surely not into double figures. So I am afraid that I think that
the opinion of Lord Atkin is an exercise more in rhetoric than in any practical
reality; a cynic might say the mouse roared, but remained a mouse. It will be noted
too that over the Greene case, he agreed with the decision of his colleagues, though
not with their reasoning.
Within the world of government the chief problem in winning the Liversidge case
for the Crown lawyers was thought to be the fact of the amendment of the original
18B, back in 1939, as was agreed at a pre-trial conference with the
Attorney-General. They need not have worried. And, as for the officials, the value
of the decision, as of course contrasted with a decision which insisted on some
form of generous disclosure of information, was neatly put by A. C. Newman of
the Treasury Solicitor's Office in a letter of 3 September 1941 to Norman Kendal
of the C.I.D.:
the value of a judgment in our favour in the House of Lords would be that we
could avoid in the future this probing into reasons in cases in which it is
embarrassing to give them.
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It was for them not about civil liberty, but about secrecy. As for Mr Liversidge he
vanished from legal history, to reappear momentarily in 1948 and 1949 as a
witness before the Lynskey Tribunal, where, after some rough handling by the
Attorney-General, which dragged up some of the old stories about him, he was
expressly and generously exonerated of any misconduct.79
In addition to habeas corpus proceedings, all of which failed, a number of other
actions were brought or commenced after 1941which attempted to secure redress
for the repulsive conditions under which those detainees who were kept in prisons
were held, in particular actions by H. H. A. de Laessoe and one Frank Arbon,
arguments being based upon breach of statutory duty by the Home Secretary and
those running the prisons.so This attempt to secure some form of redress was
effectively ended by a decision of Goddard LJ, who seems to have been no friend
of 18B detainees, on 11 December 1942; apparently some thirteen actions were
then pending, but were abandoned as hopeless.s1 No ex gratia compensation
appears to have ever been considered.
I began this paper with a quotation from Blackstone expressing a sort of domino
theory of civil liberties - once freedom of the person goes, the rest will surely
follow. I doubt if that can be said to have happened in quite the simple way
Blackstone suggested. What I think clear is that the effect of the two wars on civil
liberties was both serious, and in a sense progressive, and I must confess to a
feeling that although 18B has gone, though its successor no doubt lies on ice in
Whitehall, the position in peacetime conditions has got steadily if not dramatically
worse in my lifetime in a progression which does not seem to me to have anything
to do with which government is in power. Nor is it my impression that the courts
have, since the time of the Liversidge case, been any more successful at matching
reality to their rhetoric than they were in the 1940's. But that perhaps is a thought
which would best be left for you to ponder.
79. See Cmnd.7616 of January 1949, paras. 32-40.
80. P.R.D. TS 27/512.
81. Lord Chief Justice Goddard sat as an additional judge in the Kings Bench Division; the decision is
reported in [194311 All E.R. 154.
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